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11 Social policy regimes in the developing 
world
Ian Gough
INTRODUCTION
My aim in this chapter is to reconceptualize the welfare regime paradigm 
developed within Northern social policy studies to understand the nature 
and diversity of social policies in the South. Midgley (Chapter 10) has 
rightly criticized the relevance of the welfare regime paradigm to social 
policy dilemmas in much of the world, so this approach may seem perverse 
and will need defending. The intention is certainly not simply to ‘apply’ 
it to the South, but to radically recast it. My basic reason is that it offers 
the way out of a classic dilemma in understanding social policy and social 
development across the world. By developing a variegated middle- range 
model it avoids both over- generalization and over- specificity. A regime 
approach can recognize, on the one hand, the commonalities across the 
countries and regions of the South, while on the other hand identifying 
systematic qualitatively distinct patterns within the South. It can also 
provide a bridge between thinking about social policy in the North and 
the South, without imposing Northern frameworks and solutions on the 
rest of the world.
In adopting a regime approach we are placing ourselves within the 
historical- institutional school of social research. This attempts to steer a 
middle way between teleological or functionalist approaches (both modern-
ization and Marxist) on the one hand, and post- modern approaches empha-
sizing uniqueness and diversity on the other. It integrates structures and 
actors within a framework that promises a comparative analysis of socio-
economic systems at different stages of development and different positions 
in the world system. Similarly, it seeks to reconcile the rival ‘structural’ and 
‘actor’ approaches within development sociology (Long and van der Ploeg, 
1994). We recognize that structures are socially constructed, reproduced 
and changed through the actions of people in real time, but that, at given 
points in time, actors occupy different interest and power positions within 
structures, generating different goals, levels of autonomy and clout.
The chapter is in three parts followed by a conclusion. First, it intro-
duces the ‘welfare regime’ paradigm initially developed to understand the 
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 post- war welfare states of the West. Its underlying assumptions are revealed 
and shown to be manifestly inapplicable to much of the less developed, the 
developing and the transitional worlds of the South and the East. Second, 
two alternative ideal- type models are constructed: an informal security 
regime and, very briefly, an insecurity regime. The third section then tests 
this model by presenting the results of a cluster analysis of 65 developing 
countries at the turn of the millennium. This identifies proto- welfare states 
at one end of the spectrum and insecurity regimes at the other, but finds a 
wide range of informal security regimes in between. To maintain a clear dis-
tinction between the three ideal- type regimes, and these real- world regimes, 
I shall use the generic term ‘social policy regime’ to refer to all of them.
THE WELFARE REGIME MODEL
A welfare regime is an institutional matrix of market, state and family 
forms, which generates welfare outcomes. According to Esping- Andersen 
(1990) welfare regimes are characterized by (1) different patterns of 
state, market and household forms of social provision, (2) different 
welfare outcomes, assessed according to the degree to which labour 
is ‘de- commodified’ or shielded from market forces and (3) different 
stratification outcomes. The last component provides positive feedback: 
the stratification outcomes shape class coalitions, which tend to repro-
duce or intensify the original institutional matrix and welfare outcomes. 
‘Existing institutional arrangements heavily determine, maybe even 
over- determine, national trajectories’ (Esping- Andersen, 1999, p. 4).
Esping- Andersen (ibid., Table 5.4) identifies three welfare regimes in 
advanced capitalist countries with continual democratic histories since 
World War II: the liberal, conservative- corporatist and social- democratic. 
He summarizes their characteristics as show in Table 11.1.
This welfare regime paradigm has spawned an immense amount of 
empirical work and has attracted volumes of critical commentary and 
theoretical reworking, which can be divided into the following critiques 
(Gough, 1999):
● The identification of just three regimes and the allocation of coun-
tries between them is disputed. For example, it has been argued that 
Australia and New Zealand are not liberal, that the Mediterranean 
countries are different from North European countries and that 
Japan cannot be encompassed in such a ‘Western’ framework.
● In concentrating on income maintenance and labour market prac-
tices it overlooks critical social programmes like health, education 
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and housing that do not conform to these welfare regime patterns 
and that, further, may reveal that national patterns of social policies 
are programme- specific. For example, ‘liberal’ Britain still retains a 
universal National Health Service.
● In defining welfare outcomes in terms of de- 
commodification – insulation from market forces – it ignores other 
components of well- being, in terms of autonomy and need satisfac-
tion, and other sources of ill- being.
● In concentrating on class analysis, it ignores other sources of strati-
fication such as religion, ethnicity and gender.
● In particular, the effects of the gendered division of labour and 
household forms are ignored at all three levels (social programmes, 
welfare outcome and stratification effect).
● In emphasizing the reproduction and stability of class coalitions, 
social programmes and welfare outcomes it cannot handle dynamic 
changes and shifts in welfare regime (such as took place in Britain in 
the 1980s).
● In focusing on domestic institutions and coalitions it ignores the 
growing constraints of the global political economy and the growing 
role of supranational institutions.
This debate has encouraged modification of the regime approach even 
in its OECD heartlands. It is not our intention to review these criticisms 
Table 11.1 The three worlds of welfare capitalism
Liberal Conservative- corporatist Social- democratic
Role of:
Family Marginal Central Marginal
Market Central Marginal Marginal
State Marginal Subsidiary Central
Welfare state:
Dominant locus of 
 solidarity
Market Family State
Dominant mode of 
 solidarity
Individual Kinship
Corporatism
Etatism
Universal
Degree of de-
  commodification
Minimal High (for breadwinner) Maximum
Modal examples USA Germany, Italy Sweden
Source: Esping- Andersen (1999, Table 5.4).
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systematically here but three issues should be considered and incorporated 
before we proceed.
First, the dominant emphasis on labour markets and social pro-
tection programmes is related to the reliance on de- commodification 
as the measure of welfare outcomes. But modern welfare states also 
deliver health and other social services designed to ameliorate harm or 
suffering caused by illness, accident and frailty – what Bevan (2004a) 
calls ‘life processes’. A major result in the West is a sprawling ‘health 
state’ (Moran, 1999), with interests, institutions and dynamics of its 
own. Second, the modern state undertakes human investment and self- 
development through education, training, work experience and allied 
programmes. Heidenheimer (1981) contends that the early development 
of the mass education state in the USA provided an alternative path 
of social development to the welfare states of Europe. More recently, 
interest has grown in the OECD in ‘active’ alternatives to traditional 
‘passive’ welfare programmes. Room (2000) interprets these activities as 
‘de- commodification for self- development’, thus linking them conceptu-
ally to Esping- Andersen’s original framework. Third, another important 
failure of Esping- Andersen’s original idea of welfare regime, in the eyes 
of many, was its blindness to gender. The fact that women undertake the 
vast bulk of unpaid labour across the developed world, that this estab-
lishes a gendered division of labour embracing paid work, that caring 
duties reproduce inequalities between men and women within households 
and that this in turn entails a sharp split between the public and private 
spheres of social life – these social facts are now impinging on the analy-
sis of welfare regimes. Disputes continue, however, on whether welfare 
regimes as defined above map closely onto such gender differences (see 
O’Connor et al., 1999).
In what follows I shall extend the idea of what I will call here social policy 
regimes to incorporate provisions that ameliorate harmful life processes 
and invest in human capacities. In developing countries these may well 
extend beyond traditional health and education services. Furthermore, we 
shall assume that gendered life processes shape the welfare mix, welfare 
outcomes and stratification effects in all regimes.
In my view this framework (incorporating these prior modifications) 
offers a useful starting point for studying social policy in develop-
ment contexts for four reasons. First, the welfare regime approach is 
precisely concerned with the broader ‘welfare mix’: the interactions of 
public sector, private sector and households in producing livelihoods 
and distributing welfare: a dominant theme in the development litera-
ture. Second, it focuses not only on institutions but outcomes – the real 
states of well- being or ill- being of groups of people. Third, it is a ‘politi-
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cal economy’ approach that embeds welfare institutions in the ‘deep 
structures’ of social reproduction: it forces researchers to analyse social 
policy not merely in technical but in power terms, and this has much to 
offer. Fourth, it enables one to identify clusters of countries with welfare 
features in common; it holds out the promise of distinguishing between 
groups of developing countries according to their trajectory or paths of 
development.
To tap this potential, we must first stand back and distil its essentials. 
We contend that the following nine elements are integral to the welfare 
regime paradigm (Gough, 2004a):
1. The dominant mode of production is capitalist. There is a division 
of labour based on the ownership or non- ownership of capital; the 
dominant form of coordination is ex post via market signals; the 
technological base is dynamic, driven by a never- ending search for 
profit.
2. A set of class relations is based on this division of labour. The domi-
nant form of inequality derives from exploitation by asset owners of 
non- asset owners.
3. The dominant means of securing livelihoods is via employment in 
formal labour markets; conversely, the major threats to security stem 
from interrupted access to labour markets (and from ‘life processes’).
4. Political mobilization by the working classes and other classes and 
‘democratic class struggle’ shape an inter- class ‘political settlement’.
5. There is a ‘relatively autonomous state’ bounded by the structural 
power of capital but open to class mobilization and voice and able to 
take initiatives on its own behalf.
6. These factors, together with inherited institutional structures, shape 
a set of state institutions and practices that undertake social inter-
ventions. This state intervention combines with market and family 
 structures and processes to construct a ‘welfare mix’.
7. This welfare mix de- commodifies labour to varying degrees (and 
 provides social services and invests in human capital).
8. Together the welfare mix and welfare outcomes influence the defini-
tion of interests and the distribution of class power resources, which 
tend to reproduce the welfare regime through time.
9. Within each regime, ‘social policy’ entails intentional action within 
the public sphere to achieve normative, welfare- oriented goals.
Every one of these elements must be examined when our attention turns 
from the North to the South.
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THE INFORMAL SECURITY REGIME
This section develops the idea of an informal security regime, drawing 
heavily on the work of my colleagues Geoff Wood (2004) and Pip Bevan 
(2004a, 2004b; see also Gough and Wood, 2004; Wood and Gough, 2006). 
I summarize this work here by starkly contrasting each of the nine ele-
ments of the welfare regime framework above to an ideal- type informal 
security regime model.
First, the division of labour is not uniquely determined by a capitalist 
mode of production. On the one hand, other forms of production persist, 
develop and interact with capitalism: direct production of food and 
other goods and services, employment in informal labour markets, the 
cultural resources of communities, kin connections, smuggling and other 
illegal activities and so on. The social formation is more variegated and 
 over- determined. On the other hand, external capitalism (international 
market forces and transnational actors) heavily influences the environ-
ment of these political economies. The capitalist world system and its 
actors is, of course, not without importance in understanding advanced 
capitalist countries, but in the South there is a lack of congruity – the 
world system does not necessarily transform them into developed capital-
ist social formations.
Second, and related to this, two other forms of domination bulk large 
alongside exploitation: exclusion and coercion. Exclusion refers to proc-
esses of ‘shutting out’ certain categories of people from major social forms 
of participation (such as cultural activities and political roles) on the basis 
of their ascribed identity. A wide range of exclusionary practices – closure, 
monopolization and opportunity hoarding – are alternative sources of 
disadvantage. Coercion refers to ‘all concerted application, threatened or 
actual, of actions that commonly cause loss or damage’ (Tilly, 1999, p. 36). 
It can vary from discrete threats to the full- scale destruction of people 
and communities. In much of the developing world, economy- based 
exploitation relations are interwoven with other systems of inequality and 
domination.
Third, the idea of livelihoods replaces that of labour markets. Individuals 
and families use diverse strategies to make a living, involving various types 
of labour. Standing (2000) distinguishes alongside wage labour: share-
cropping, peasant agriculture, tribal cultivation, nomadic pastoralism, 
artisans, outworking, family working and bonded labour. In addition, 
migration for labour, petty trade, begging and petty crime also coexist. The 
modern peasant moves between different forms of employment and ways 
of life; in Kearney’s (1996) term they are ‘polybians’, akin to amphibians 
moving between aquatic and terrestrial environments. Another important 
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difference from the ideal modern capitalist model concerns the lack of a 
clear division between production and reproduction and the significance 
of ‘non- productive’ activities, including investment in social networks.
Fourth, political mobilization takes different forms. Class power 
resources and mobilization can no longer be privileged. Ethnicity, region, 
religion, caste, age groups, clan or kinship groups and other interpersonal 
networks can all form the basis of identity and mobilization. In Parson’s 
(1951) terms ascribed status remains as important as achieved identity. 
The complexity of sources of identification, and the existence of excluded 
groups outside the political system altogether, confounds or precludes the 
emergence of political class settlements. Political stability reflects political 
equilibrium rather than a negotiated compromise.
Fifth, ‘states’ are at best weakly differentiated from surrounding social 
and power systems. Political relationships are particularistic and diffuse, 
are based on interpersonal obligations, mix together economic, instrumen-
tal and political elements of exchange, yet are premised on deep inequali-
ties in power between patrons and clients (Eisenstadt and Roniger, 1984, 
pp. 48–9). This patron- clientelism engenders a widespread form of politi-
cal incorporation of subordinate classes. The result is a dependence of 
the powerless on relationships that may offer a measure of security in the 
short run but prevent their longer- term liberation and ability to enhance 
their security and welfare. In Wood’s phrase (2001), they are ‘adversely 
incorporated’.
Sixth, the institutional landscape of the welfare mix becomes problem-
atic. At one level, a wider range of institutions and actors are involved in 
modifying livelihood structures and their outcomes. At the domestic level, 
‘communities’, informal groups and more formal NGOs, figure as infor-
mal actors and add a fourth institutional actor to the state–market–family 
trinity. More important, all four elements have important counterparts at 
the supranational level: outside economic actors such as transnational cor-
porations or semi- illegal traders; international governance organizations 
such as the IMF, the World Bank, the WTO, the arms of powerful nation- 
states such as the USA and international aid bodies; international NGOs. 
Even the household sector has an international dimension, through migra-
tion and remittances. Thus, a broader ‘institutional responsibility matrix’ 
emerges as shown in Table 11.2.
But the complexity does not stop there. The informal security model 
does not presume the degree of institutional differentiation of the classic 
welfare regime model. On the contrary, the different institutions do not 
operate independently of each other in terms of rules and pervading 
moralities. Self- interest is not confined to the market realm, loyalty to the 
family realm and group interests to the political realm. Instead there is 
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permeability. Behaviour is frequently not different when acting within the 
state, the market, the community or the family. As Wood (2004, p. 58) puts 
it: ‘Markets are imperfect, communities clientelist, households patriarchal 
and states marketized, patrimonial and clientelist’.
Seventh, ‘de- commodification’ becomes even less suitable as a measure 
of welfare outcomes than in the OECD world. The very notion of de- 
commodification does not make sense when economic behaviour is not 
commodified and where states and markets are not distinct realms. As 
already argued, the goal and measure of welfare needs to expand to take 
on board protection against ‘life processes’, amelioration of exclusion and 
active investment for self- development. More than that, the fuzzy distinc-
tion between development and welfare and the wider range of threats to 
security (such as from violence and physical insecurity) entail nothing 
less than an audit of basic and intermediate need satisfaction (Doyal and 
Gough, 1991, Ch. 8).
Eighth, the notion of path- dependent development has a broader appli-
cability. Countries dependent on overseas aid or NGO- based provision or 
remittances from migrant labour or clientelist networks will develop group 
interests and alliances that may act to continue and extend the private ben-
efits these generate. Even societies with persistent civil and cross- border 
wars may organize livelihoods and develop forms of collective provision 
that adapt to war and reproduce through time. However, the vulnerability 
of poorer countries in the face of an uncontrollable external environment 
undermines path dependency and frequently replaces it with uncertainty 
and unpredictable change. The likelihood of stable political settlements is 
also undermined – instead, unstable political equilibria are more common.
Last, the very idea of social policy as a conscious countervailing force 
in Polanyi’s sense (Polanyi, 1944), whereby the public realm subjects and 
controls the private realm in the interests of collective welfare goals, is 
thrown into question. Social policy in the West is based at some level 
on the idea that behaviour in one sphere can be successfully deployed to 
modify behaviour in another sphere. More specifically, mobilization in 
civil society can, via the state, impose collectivist values on the pursuit of 
Table 11.2 Components of the institutional responsibility matrix
Domestic Supranational
State Domestic governance International organizations, national donors
Market Domestic markets Global markets, MNCs
Community Civil society, NGOs International NGOs
Household Households International household strategies
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individual interests in the market (and the family). Like Ulysses tempted 
by the Sirens, citizens and voters voluntarily chain and restrict their ability 
to pursue their short- term desires in the pursuit of longer- term collective 
needs (Elster, 1979). However, if permeability rules and the principles of 
different domains ‘contaminate’ each other, then social policy cannot act 
as an independent countervailing force, or will reinforce privilege, private 
short- term gain, exclusion or domination. In this situation ‘all are prison-
ers’ (Wood, 2000).
The net result of these nine features of the peasant analogue is an ‘infor-
mal security regime’, as far removed conceptually from the original idea 
of a welfare regime as in reality. Table 11.3 summarizes these contrasts.
We should stress that the above account of the informal security regime 
is an ideal- type counter- position to what is after all an ideal- type welfare 
state regime model. Nevertheless, this now establishes two poles between 
which we may range real- world countries and regions in the present epoch. 
This is our goal in the next section.
However, we are not finished yet. For there is a third ideal- type regime 
where neither formal nor informal security obtain: an insecurity regime. 
According to Bevan (2004a, 2004b), this is characterized by chronic 
conflict and exterminatory wars, ‘vampire’ states, shadow states and 
absent states, mobilization via militarization, wide gaps in institutional 
responsibility, absent social policies and extreme suffering. In this (non- )
ideal- type, chronic insecurity is the norm and social policy is the province 
of  humanitarian aid regimes.
MAPPING INFORMAL SECURITY REGIMES
Is there any evidence for this regime model, and how should we research 
it? Esping- Andersen writes: ‘The linear scoring approach (more or less 
power, democracy or spending) contradicts the sociological notion that 
power, democracy, or welfare are relationally structured phenomena. . . . 
Welfare state variations . . . are not linearly distributed, but clustered by 
regime types’ (Esping- Andersen, 1990, p. 26). For this reason Miriam Abu 
Sharkh and I have regarded cluster analysis as the most suitable method 
to test these arguments (see for full details and arguments Abu Sharkh and 
Gough, 2010).
To map welfare regimes we need data on at least two of the dimensions 
originally theorized by Esping- Andersen: the welfare mix and welfare 
outcomes. The welfare mix describes the entire pattern of resources 
and programmes that can act to enhance welfare or security in a 
 nation- state. However, to operationalize this across the non- OECD world 
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is  exceptionally difficult, not least because of lack of data. Thus, we could 
find no valid, reliable and comparative measures of: privately provided 
pensions and services (except for health purchases); community and 
NGO- provided welfare; the role of households and wider kin groups, 
except for overseas remittances; and little on the role and influence of 
transnational actors, except aid donors. Given this unfortunate fact, we 
are reduced at this stage to inferring the nature of informal and insecurity 
regimes from the data that are available.
To capture the extent of state responsibility for critical social resources, 
we use two pairs of variables covering expenditure/revenues and service 
delivery. The latter reflects the concern of Esping- Andersen that public 
expenditure is a poor indicator of welfare regimes. We must perforce rely 
on this, given data inadequacies in developing countries, but we are able 
to complement it with information on public service outputs (to be distin-
guished from welfare outcomes below). The first pair is:
● public spending on education and health as a share of GDP;
● social security contributions as a share of total government revenues 
(as a proxy for provision of social insurance benefits).
The second pair is:
● immunization against measles: a fairly restricted social policy target;
● secondary school enrolment of females: a higher, more extensive 
output target.
To represent international aspects of the welfare mix we have measures of 
two external transfer flows:
● official aid;
● remittances from overseas migrants.
To measure welfare outcomes we wanted to use the classic human develop-
ment indicators of life expectancy, literacy and poverty. However, because 
of doubts about the reliability of poverty estimates we relied on the first 
two indices:
● life expectancy at birth;
● the illiteracy rate of young people aged 15–24 years.
We use cluster analysis to map the patterns of these variables for 
65 non- OECD countries in 2000 (Abu Sharkh and Gough, 2010). The 
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 techniques, research design, list of countries included and major results 
are all reported in this article, so will not be repeated here. This analysis 
generates eight country clusters, which can be ordered according to the 
distances of their final cluster centres from the OECD welfare states (see 
Table 11.4). The cluster with the highest scores for public expenditure, 
public provision and welfare outcomes is labelled A. Most remote from 
this cluster are clusters G and H. The main findings for the year 2000 are 
summarized in Table 11.4.
The main findings are as follows. Countries in cluster A exhibit some 
characteristics of Western welfare states and may be labelled proto- welfare 
states. They share in common relatively extensive state commitments to 
welfare provision and relatively effective delivery of services plus moder-
ately extensive social security programmes and superior welfare outcomes 
(by, it must be stressed, the standards of the non- OECD world). In a 
further cluster analysis of revenue sources, we also find these are the only 
countries that rely on substantial social security contributions (Gough 
and Abu Sharkh, 2011). Apart from Israel and Costa Rica, this cluster 
comprises two distinct geographical zones and historical antecedents: the 
countries of the former Soviet Union and its bloc members and the rela-
tively industrialized countries of southern South America. Both developed 
European- style forms of social protection policies in the middle of the 
twentieth century, and both suffered degradation of these in the late twen-
tieth century through the external imposition of neo- liberal programmes.
Cluster B exhibits the second- best level of welfare outcomes and social 
service outputs yet with low levels of state social spending (and low reli-
ance on external flows of aid and remittances). This interesting com-
bination suggests that security and welfare outcomes are enhanced by 
fast- growing average incomes and/or by other domestic, non- state, infor-
mal institutions. This combination is found in three major world regions: 
(1) China and most countries in East Asia from Korea through Thailand 
to Sri Lanka (except Indonesia, which dropped out of this group in 2000 
having suffered most from the 1997 crisis); (2) the remaining countries of 
South and Central America not in cluster A; and (3) some countries in 
Western Asia (Iran, Turkey and Tajikistan).
Cluster C comprises mainly low- middle income countries distinguished 
by great reliance on remittances from abroad, which account for 9 per cent 
of gross national income on average and that constitute an informal func-
tional alternative to public transfers. It comprises small countries in the 
Caribbean and Central America, plus Ecuador, Morocco and Sri Lanka.
In Southern and East Africa (South Africa, Namibia, Botswana, 
Zimbabwe and Kenya) a distinct cluster D exhibited in 2000 relatively 
extensive public social policy (in both expenditures and outreach and 
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literacy levels), but with poor health outcomes, due in large part to the 
HIV- AIDS pandemic.
Cluster E comprises another small group of countries in Sub- Saharan 
Africa, plus Indonesia, which ‘fell’ from cluster B in 1990 due to the severe 
effects of the 1997 crisis. This is a heterogeneous group with relatively high 
foreign aid, low rates of girls’ schooling but paradoxically high levels of 
youth literacy.
Cluster F, with at its core the countries of the Indian sub- continent – India, 
Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal – exhibits high levels of illiteracy and 
low numbers of females in secondary education. They boast a plethora 
of targeted social programmes and informal security mechanisms, but, 
the absence of effective schooling, health and social protection policies 
coupled with highly gendered outcomes, according to such indicators as 
the population sex ratio, betokens high levels of insecurity among the mass 
of the population.
Clusters G and H, mainly countries in Sub- Saharan Africa, exhibit low 
and in some cases falling life expectancy alongside relatively weak states 
with low levels of public responsibility, indicated both by spending levels 
and social outputs, and higher dependence on overseas aid. The  prevalence 
of poverty is also high and persistent.
Thus, we find a highly variegated pattern of welfare and illfare systems 
across the Global South. We conclude that different groups of countries in 
the developing world face divergent threats to human well- being and diver-
gent potentials for social policies to mitigate these. In Central and parts of 
Eastern Europe and parts of South America, despite serious erosion of 
their traditional welfare systems, we see a potential for new forms of social 
citizenship. These cluster A countries may be labelled proto- welfare states. 
In much of Sub- Saharan Africa, what social programmes there are have 
been eroded and submerged beneath a rising tide of human need. Clusters 
G and H remain zones of high insecurity and illfare, resembling our inse-
curity regime. However, the existence of a distinct informal security regime 
is less certain. It stretches over seven of our clusters and is much more vari-
egated. Some states are relatively successful, other close to failing:
Successful ISRs Cluster B combines relatively good welfare outcomes 
and social service outputs with remarkably low levels of state social spend-
ing and low levels of external flows (aid and remittances). This interesting 
combination suggests a successful informal security regime. Countries 
in this group are mainly but not always low- middle income, with high 
growth rates, but are relatively undemocratic and unequal. However, the 
degree of variation within the cluster is rather high, and culturally and 
historically it is a disparate group. There are several factors that might 
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explain their good performance, as well as the existence of effective infor-
mal security mechanisms (which we cannot independently measure). In 
countries like Chile and Korea, with social protection systems mandated 
by governments but administered privately, the mandated contributions 
of employers and employees will not figure as government expenditures or 
as social security contributions. Such countries would probably be identi-
fied as proto- welfare states if our data were more sensitive. Moreover, in 
several East Asian countries levels of welfare are likely to be enhanced by 
‘developmental states’ with considerable infrastructure capacity to pursue 
agricultural and industrial policies but that do not develop traditional 
social policies. The welfare- enhancing impact of the state extends beyond 
traditional social policy – or at least our indicators of it. In a study of 
East Asian countries I followed Holliday (2000) in characterizing these as 
examples of a ‘productivist social development regime’ (Gough, 2004b).
Failing ISRs: high illiteracy First, there is the high illiteracy cluster 
centred on the Indian sub- continent: India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and 
Nepal (not Sri Lanka). It is a notable and robust finding across a wide 
range of variables and k- numbers that South Asia is always differentiated 
from East and South East Asia, most notably due to its illiteracy, espe-
cially among women. Though these countries boast a plethora of public 
programmes and informal security mechanisms, the absence of effective 
schooling, health and security policies coupled with highly gendered out-
comes, according to such indicators as the population sex ratio, betokens 
high levels of insecurity among the mass of the population. But these are 
by no means failed states – several now post high growth rates and India is 
proclaimed as a future economic giant.
Failing ISRs: high morbidity A second cluster emerged in 2000 in 
Southern and East Africa, comprising South Africa, Namibia, Botswana, 
Zimbabwe and Kenya. These are high spending – high taxation countries 
(tax revenues average no less than 23 per cent of GDP) with good outreach 
and literacy levels. But they suffer from high levels of mortality and mor-
bidity (Gough and Abu Sharkh, 2011). This will be due in part to the HIV/
AIDS pandemic; but it may also reflect current high levels of inequality 
and the recent racist structures of social policy.
If we examine societal correlates of these different clusters certain pat-
terns emerge (Abu Sharkh and Gough, 2010). Economic development is 
important: there is a clear gradient in income per head as we move down 
the regime alphabet. While the average income of cluster A is close to 
upper- middle income, the ISR clusters range from lower- middle income to 
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borderline low income (using World Bank categories). Income inequality 
does not vary in a linear way across the welfare regime types; rather it is 
an inverse U- shaped relationship. Clusters B and C are significantly more 
inegalitarian (as is the distinctive Southern African cluster) than group A 
and group F centred on South Asia.
The Gurr indicator of democracy records a global spread of democracy 
between 1990 and 2000, such that by 2000 there were no evident linkages 
between democratic practices and clusters. Within the informal security 
regimes, cluster C scores moderately well on democracy and welfare, D 
and E on welfare but not democracy, F on democracy but not welfare. 
The imposition and rapid spread since 1990 of Western models of, at least 
nominally, democratic practices, has undermined any previous correla-
tions with regime type. Put another way, in 2000 there appears to be no 
significant link at the cluster level between civil- political and social rights.
Turning to cultural variables, the effects of cultural diversity on eco-
nomic development have been extensively studied using measures of 
‘ethno- linguistic fractionalization’ (ELF). Our research shows least cul-
tural diversity among the proto- welfare states of cluster A, and most in 
cluster F. Most of the differences in ELF scores between clusters is signifi-
cant, supporting the hypothesis that high cultural diversity within nations 
is associated with weak institutionalization of mechanisms of welfare.
Finally, we consider the influence of historical factors on emerg-
ing welfare regimes by applying Therborn’s four ‘roads to modernity’ 
(Therborn, 1992). The four routes are: (1) the first, West European route, 
which later embraced Eastern Europe and Russia; (2) the ‘settler socie-
ties’ of the New Worlds including both North and South America as 
well as Australasia and southern Eastern Africa; (3) the colonial zone of 
remaining Sub- Saharan Africa and much of Asia; and (4) the countries of 
‘externally- induced modernization’, where nominally independent states 
in the face of Western pressures undertook autonomous strategies of 
development (including such nations as Japan, China, Thailand, Egypt 
and Turkey). We allocated countries to these four groups using the Times 
Concise Atlas of World History as a basic source (Barraclough, 1982) and 
cross- tabulated the results. This shows that the countries in cluster A are 
all members of the first two routes to modernity: Central and Eastern 
Europe and Latin American ‘settler’ countries. The most successful ISR 
clusters (B and C) embrace all four routes and display no clear historical 
background; however, all the countries of ‘externally- induced moderniza-
tion’ are in cluster B (China, Korea, Thailand, Iran and Turkey). Cluster 
D comprises southern African settler countries and adjacent territories. 
The remaining clusters E–H with poorer welfare outcomes have all had a 
history of Western colonization.
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CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has sought to adapt and apply the welfare regime approach, 
developed to provide a comparative analysis of social policy and welfare 
outcomes in the OECD region, to the developing world. The cluster 
analysis in the last part provides some support for our theoretical frame-
work, but also reveals more complexity. At the two extremes, the exist-
ence of proto- welfare states and insecurity regimes is confirmed. Indeed, 
their most significant and persistent correlates are the least tractable: 
historical path of development and internal cultural diversity. However, 
the ‘middle’ concept of informal security regimes requires unbundling. 
All ISRs have in common lower- middle income per head and low levels 
of state expenditure on welfare. But they vary greatly, for example in 
democracy ratings and historical antecedents. These contribute to a 
wide spectrum of welfare outcomes ranging from the creditable to the 
very poor; in sum, from successful to failing systems of predominantly 
 informal welfare.
The very idea of welfare states and welfare regimes entails the conscious 
imposition by public actors of collective values and choices on unplanned 
market outcomes. Thus, it might be concluded, ‘globalization’ fatally 
undermines the prospects for further welfare regime development across 
the world. And indeed this is a recurring theme in much contemporary 
literature. Yet, as regards the North, evidence to back up this assertion is 
remarkably thin. On the contrary, the conclusion of comparative studies 
of OECD countries is that global pressures are effectively mediated by the 
different welfare regimes: common pressures generate distinct policy reac-
tions according to the domestic pattern of institutions, interests and ideas. 
Nation welfare regimes appear to be resilient in the face of transnational 
forces (Swank, 2002).
Yet it would be quite Panglossian to assume that the same conclusion 
can be drawn for the South. Indeed, many are pessimistic. Deacon (2000), 
for example, concludes that the preconditions to build cross- class political 
coalitions are fatally weakened by the opportunities available to Southern 
elites and middle classes to ‘exit’ from national social policies and pro-
grammes. It would take another chapter or more to address this question. 
Yet, our approach offers some support against this dystopian scenario. It 
is likely that, across much of the world, nation- states will remain crucial 
sites of contestation, including contestation over social policies. But actors 
will not contest them under circumstances of their own choosing. It makes 
no sense to apply a ‘one- size- fits- all’ model to analyse the nature of social 
policy and social development across these countries and regions, let alone 
to conceive and promote alternative social policies.
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